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Individuals often repeatedly face a choice of whether to obey a particular legal rule. Con-
ventional legal scholarship assumes that whether such a choice is made repeatedly or is a one-time
event has no effect on individuals' decisions. In either case, individuals are expected to maximize
their payoffs. Experimental studies, however, suggest that individuals facing a recurring choice, in
contrast to individuals making the choice only once, do not behave as maximizers Instead, individuals
facing the choice repeatedly apply the strategy of "probability matching." For example, individuals
failed to maximize when presented with a die with four red faces and two white faces, and asked to
predict the colors of a series of rolls. Although maximization demands consistently betting on the
red, individuals preferred a "mixed" approach; red was chosen in 2/3 of the rolls and white in 1/3
of the rolls
This Article presents several normative and descriptive applications that probability match-
ing has in the legal context. Normatively, it shows how probability matching affects optimal in-
vestment in law enforcement. Descriptively, it suggests that probability matching provides a new
rationale for existing legal doctrines, such as the imposition of punitive damages on repeated
wrongdoers, the imposition of harsher sanctions on recidivists and rules attributing liability for the
mere infliction of risks. This Article thus shows that experimental findings corroborate the intuition
that law ought to, and in fact does, differentiate sharply between repeated and single-instance behavior.
Individuals often repeatedly face a choice of whether to obey a
particular legal rule. A driver parking her car on the street needs to
decide every morning whether to pay the required parking fee; a pol-
luter must routinely choose whether to comply with the relevant envi-
ronmental regulations; a grocer must choose repeatedly whether or
not to report her gains to the tax authorities.
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Conventional legal scholarship has long assumed that whether
such choices are made repeatedly or on a one-time basis is expected
to have little or no effect on individuals' decisions. Following models
of rational choice theory, traditional legal analysis predicts that, in
either case, individuals would form their choices in a way that maxi-
mizes their payoff. Whether required to decide routinely or only once,
rational individuals are assumed to obey the law whenever the benefit
from breaching the law is outweighed by the expected cost.
A large body of experimental literature, however, suggests that
individuals facing a recurring choice do not behave as predicted by the
conventional rationality assumption. As this literature demonstrates,
when a choice involving probabilistic outcomes is presented repeat-
edly, individuals tend to decide suboptimally. Rather than maximizing
their payoff, individuals under such circumstances often follow the
strategy of "probability matching."
A representative demonstration of the "probability matching"
phenomenon was illustrated by Charles Gallistel.' In Gallistel's ex-
periment, a number of Yale students and a rat were pitted against each
other. The rat was first trained to run a T-shaped maze with a feeder at
the end of each branch. In each trial only one of the feeders was
"armed." If the rat chose the armed feeder, it got a pellet of food. If it
chose the unarmed feeder, the trial ended with the rat receiving noth-
ing. Above each feeder was a light, which turned on when the feeder
was armed. The students could see the light, but the rat could not. Fi-
nally, the experiment was designed so that on a randomly chosen 75
percent of the trials, the feeder in the left branch was armed; in the
other 25 percent, the feeder in the right branch was armed.
After allowing the students to observe the relative probabilities
over a number of rounds, the students were asked to predict before
every trial which light - right or left - would turn on. Thus, like the rat,
they had to make a choice between two probabilistic outcomes, where
one outcome was three times as likely as the other. Because the food
was allocated randomly, the strategy that maximized success was to
always choose the left side-the more frequently armed feeder. To
choose the right side was to opt for the side that pays off only 25 per-
cent of the time in preference to the side that pays off 75 percent of
the time. The results showed that the rat, rather quickly, followed the
optimizing strategy; in almost all trials it chose the left feeder. The
undergraduates, by contrast, almost never chose the high payoff side
exclusively. More specifically, the students "matched" the relative fre-
I Charles R. Gallistel, The Organization of Learning 351-52 (MIT 1990) (providing a
comprehensive examination of several models and characteristics of learning).
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quency of their choices to the relative frequencies that the sides were
armed. On average, the students choose the left side approximately 75
percent of the time.
Probability matching has been observed in a series of studies, un-
der different experimental settings, and despite efforts to induce indi-
viduals to behave as mandated by rational choice theory. This Article
investigates the relevance of probability matching to law enforcement
policies as well as to legal doctrine. It demonstrates that probability
matching may affect the optimal level of investment in law enforce-
ment. It also suggests that probability matching may provide a new
rationale for the prevalent use of "escalating sanctions," both in tort
and in criminal law. Last, the Article also explains how probability
matching accounts for the design of different liability systems.
Part I provides the theoretical background. It presents the large
body of experimental scholarship concerning probability matching
and surveys some attempts to explain this phenomenon. Part II ana-
lyzes the relevance of probability matching to law enforcement. In
particular, it demonstrates that an optimal enforcement system aimed
at regulating recurring activities ought to take into account the behav-
ior predicted by probability matching. The last two Parts demonstrate
how probability matching can provide a rationale for various legal
rules and doctrines. Part III shows that probability matching can ex-
plain the practice of imposing harsher sanctions for repeated miscon-
duct both in the context of torts (by imposing punitive damages on
those who repeatedly perform wrongs) and in the context of criminal
law (by imposing harsher sanctions on recidivists). As the analysis il-
lustrates, both legal practices produce the necessary incentives for
individuals most likely to behave as probability matchers. Part IV shows
how probability matching may affect the design of different liability
regimes. In particular, probability matching shows the advantages of
using a risk-based liability system (imposing costs on the creation of
risks) rather than the use of a harm-based liability system (imposing
costs only for the creation of risks that materialize in harm).
Conventional scholarship is often accused of ignoring reality and
positing unrealistic assumptions. This Article is part of a growing at-
2 Id at 352.
3 The first experiments demonstrating probability matching were conducted in the early
1950s. Since then new experiments have been designed that corroborated the early results and
extended them. For a recent review of the literature, see, for example, David R. Shanks, Richard
J. Tunney, and John D. McCarthy, A Re-examination of Probability Matching and Rational
Choice, 15 J Beh Dec Making 233,233-35 (2002). See also note 11.
4 See, for example, Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal L Rev 1051, 1056-58
(2000) (criticizing law and economics and demonstrating the relevance of behavioral sciences in
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tempt by legal scholars to exploit the findings of social sciences when
designing legal rules and providing new rationales for existing legal
doctrines This Article demonstrates that the intuition that law ought
to differentiate sharply between repeated misconduct and single-instance
misconduct can be rationalized and grounded in the findings of the
experimental literature.
I. PROBABILITY MATCHING: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Studies conducted both by psychologists and economists show
that probability matching is a persistent phenomenon, occurring under
different experimental settings. Part L.A describes these studies. Part
I.B discusses the possible explanations for this apparently irrational
behavior.
A. Experimental Studies
Assume a die with four red faces and two white faces. You are
told that the die will be rolled 100 times. You are also told that if you
correctly predict the color of each roll, you will receive a reward -$10
for a correct "red" guess and $10 for a correct "white" guess. What
would one do under these circumstances? What ought one to do un-
der these circumstances?
The "maximization rule"-the rule that maximizes the expected
value of awards-would require participants to choose the red color
in all 100 rolls. Yet participants in such a game who were asked to
designing legal doctrine); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1476 (1998) (distinguishing between "real
people" and "homo economicus" and emphasizing the importance of investigating the behavior
of "real people").
5 See, for example, Ehud Guttel, Overcorrection, 93 Georgetown L J 241, 260-77 (2004)
(explaining and justifying various evidence doctrines on the basis of empirical studies demon-
strating the "overcorrection effect"); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L Rev 777,829 (2001) (arguing that different legal rules may
"reflect conscious or subconscious efforts to combat the consequences of egocentric biases");
Alon Harel and Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on
the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 Am L & Econ Rev 276, 281-85 (1999)
(using psychological insights to rationalize legal rules concerning enforcement and imposition of
criminal sanctions); Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1489-1522 (cited in note 4)
(providing ample empirical evidence that human behavior differs from the behavior predicted
by economists and using psychological findings to explain legal doctrines); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U Chi L Rev 571,574 (1998) (dem-
onstrating how "courts have already done a remarkable job of adapting to the limitations of
human judgment in hindsight"); David Cohen and Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Dispari-
ties Between Measures of Economic Values, 30 Osgoode Hall L J 737, 749-69 (1992) (using be-
havioral-decision research findings to explain a variety of common law doctrines).
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evaluate alternative strategies often preferred a "mixed" approach.
According to this strategy, bets are divided so that red is chosen in 2/3
of the rolls and white in 1/3 of the rolls. Choosing red in all 100 rolls
produces, on average, 66.6 correct "red" guesses. The "mixed" ap-
proach, in contrast, provides 44.4 correct red guesses (2/3 x 2/3 x 100)
and 11.1 correct white guesses (1/3 x 1/3 x 100), for a total of only 55.5
correct guesses. Psychologists and economists have labeled this phe-
nomenon "probability matching."' Probability matching can be de-
fined as the tendency to adopt a mixed strategy dictated by the rela-
tive frequency of events, even when the utility-maximizing strategy
would be to always behave in a way that presupposes that the most
8
probable event would occur.
Probability matching suggests that there is a difference between
the behavior of participants in a single-shot decision and in cases in-
volving a recurring decision. In a single roll of a die with four red faces
6 For studies reporting such results, see Richard F West and Keith E. Stanovich, Is Probabil-
ity Matching Smart? Associations Between Probabilistic Choices and Cognitive Ability, 31 Memory
& Cognition 243, 244-45 (2003) (finding that most college students participating in a die-rolling
experiment rejected the maximization rule and instead applied the strategy of probability match-
ing); Iddo Gal and Jonathan Baron, Understanding Repeated Simple Choices, 2 Thinking & Rea-
soning 81, 93-96 (1996) (reporting that a substantial number of participants did not opt for the
maximization rule); Cameron R. Peterson and Z.J. Ulehla, Sequential Patterns and Maximizing,
69 J Exp Psych 1, 2-3 (1965) (showing that although motivated by real money awards for correct
guesses, only five out of twenty individuals consistently guessed "red").
7 Probability matching should not be confused with the "gambler's fallacy" phenomenon.
The gambler's fallacy refers to the tendency of individuals to assume that the odds for an event
with a fixed probability increase or decrease depending upon recent occurrences. The gambler's
fallacy deals with individuals' predictions concerning a single event. For example, given six con-
secutive heads, the gambler's fallacy induces individuals to predict the next toss of the coin
would be a tail. In contrast, probability matching refers to the predictions individuals will make
given a series of events. Probability matching experiments have indicated that individuals' ten-
dency to "match" probabilities occurs even where participants manifest no tendency for the
gambler's fallacy. See, for example, M.P Friedman, et al, Two-Choice Behavior Under Extended
Training with Shifting Probabilities of Reinforcement, in R.C. Atkinson, ed, Studies in Mathemati-
cal Psychology 250, 290 (Stanford 1964) (analyzing participants' choices in a probability match-
ing experiment and finding the absence of any "negative recency effect," that is, the gambler's
fallacy). See also Lee Roy Beach and Richard G. Swensson, Instructions about Randomness and
Run Dependency in Two-Choice Learning, 75 J Exp Psych 279, 280 (1967) (demonstrating the
phenomenon of probability matching in an experiment where participants were explicitly in-
structed to "ignore the runs and to avoid the gambler's fallacy").
8 The fact that participants fail to maximize their payoffs in the repeated choice scenarios
has attracted the attention of rational choice theorists. Kenneth Arrow, for example, noted that
"[wie have here an experimental situation which is essentially of an economic nature in the sense
of seeking to achieve a maximum of expected reward, and yet the individual does not in fact, at
any point, even in a limit, reach the optimal behavior." Kenneth J. Arrow, Utilities, Attitudes,
Choices: A Review Note, 26 Econometrica 1, 14 (1958) (describing the results of an experiment
where individuals are asked to predict an event the occurrence of which is random with a con-
stant probability). For a recent critique of the phenomenon from the perspective of rational
choice, see Nir Vulkan, An Economist's Perspective on Probability Matching, 14 J Econ Surv 101,
113-14 (2000).
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and two white faces, individuals consistently pick the red color. In con-
trast, when presented with a recurring decision involving many rolls of
the die, participants do not simply make decisions as if each game is
independent. Instead, their guesses are guided by the ratio of relevant
probabilities and, consequently, they adopt a mixed strategy. Put dif-
ferently, while in a one-shot game with a binary choice individuals will
maximize their prospects of success, in repeated choice scenarios they
will behave in a suboptimal manner.
Probability matching has been extensively documented in the ex-
perimental literature.0 Several dozen experiments have shown that
participants consistently deviate from the maximization rule." In one
of the classic experiments, duplicated many times, participants ob-
served a long series of flashing lights, some of them green and others
red. The flashing lights appeared on the screen randomly, but such that
70 percent of the flashing lights were green and 30 percent red. At the
9 This difference in individuals' behavior patterns was recently illustrated by Michael
Birnbaum and Sandra Wakcher. In their study, Birnbaum and Wakcher showed participants
several hundred simulations of races involving two horses. One horse was proven to be more suc-
cessful, although the other horse prevailed occasionally. Subsequently, participants were asked to
predict which of the two horses was likely to win in each of the next 100 races. Results indicated
that most participants did not bet consistently on the more "successful" horse, but rather followed
the strategy of probability matching. In contrast, when asked to make one final prediction con-
cerning the last race, almost all participants chose the "successful" horse. See Michael H. Birn-
baum and Sandra V. Wakcher, Web-based Experiments Controlled by JavaScript: An Example
from Probability Learning, 34 Beh Rsrch Methods, Instruments, & Computers 189,196 (2002).
10 See, for example, Edmund Fantino and Ali Esfandiari, Probability Matching: Encourag-
ing Optimal Responding in Humans, 56 Can J Exp Psych 58 (2002).
11 For an overview of the literature, see Jerome L. Myers, Probability Learning and Se-
quence Learning, in W.K. Estes, ed, 3 Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Process: Approaches
to Human Learning and Motivation 171,172-84 (Lawrence Erlbaum 1976). While probability
matching has been extensively documented, several studies have indicated that it may decrease
(although not disappear) under some circumstances. It was shown, for example, that after a very
large number of trials, some individuals' asymptomatic performance exceeds the results pre-
dicted by probability matching. High monetary rewards/fines for correct/incorrect guesses were
also shown to induce some individuals to perform better. See Vulkan, 14 J Econ Surv at 106-11
(cited in note 8). Nevertheless, "while instructional and motivational manipulation can yield
increased probability of predicting the more frequent event, subjects consistently fall short of the
optimal strategy of always predicting that event." Myers, Probability Learning and Sequence
Learning at 177. In fact, in some studies, monetary payoffs caused participants to perform worse
than participants who did not play for real money. For experiments in which participants per-
formed suboptimally despite monetary payoffs and a large number of trials, see Shanks, Tunney,
and McCarthy, 15 J Beh Dec Making at 234 (cited in note 3) (concluding that the experimental
literature shows that "even under monetary payoffs" participants failed to maximize and "con-
tinue[d] to forfeit payoffs"); Anthony Patt, Understanding Uncertainty: Forecasting Seasonal Climate
for Farmers in Zimbabwe, 6 Risk, Dec & Policy 105, 111-14 (2001) (conducting an experiment
demonstrating individuals' tendency to match probabilities even when the payoff for correct
guesses was very large); Daniel Friedman and Dominic W. Massaro, Understanding Variability in
Binary and Continuous Choice, 5 Psychonomic Bull & Rev 370,386 (1998) (showing that "chang-
ing the decision treatment from score to score + pay did not reliably" improve performance).
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end of an initial session in which the lights were shown, participants
were asked to guess the color of each of the next 100 flashing lights.
Consistent with the probability matching phenomenon, 70 percent of
the time participants predicted that the next flashing light would be
green, and 30 percent of the time that it would be red. Participants
were capable of observing the probability of the appearance of the
lights, but failed to pursue the optimal strategy--the strategy most
likely to maximize their payoffs. Instead of always choosing green and
thus guessing correctly in 70 percent of cases, they adjusted their an-
swers to the relative frequency of the events. Experiments have also
indicated that probability matching similarly occurs when the out-
comes are not binary (red or green), and include more than just two
choices. Experiments employing three choices, for example, showed
that individuals fail to maximize and generally match their choices to
the relevant probabilities."
Studies indicate that participants apply probability matching for
gains as well as for losses. For example, in one version of the flashing
lights experiment, participants were given monetary rewards for every
correct guess. In another form of the experiment, participants were
granted a certain amount of money as an endowment, and a fine was
imposed for every incorrect answer. The results showed that, in both
instances, individuals correctly observed the probability of each color,
but failed to adopt the rule that maximized their prospects of guessing
correctly. Instead, participants consistently followed the probability
matching strategy. Similarly, experiments involving both rewards for
correct guesses and penalties for incorrect guesses have indicated that
participants acted as probability matchers.3 Finally, the distribution of
probabilities was also found to have no bearing on the participants'
behavior. It proved to be insignificant whether the proportion between
green and red lights was 90 percent to 10 percent or 60 percent to 40
percent. In all cases, participants failed to maximize; their prediction of
12 See Myers, Probability Learning and Sequence Learning at 173-74 (cited in note 11)
(summarizing the results of several studies involving three or more probabilistic outcomes).
13 For an example, see Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Ido Erev, On Learning to Become a Suc-
cessful Loser: A Comparison of Alternative Abstractions of Learning Processes in the Loss Do-
main, 42 J Math Psych 266, 277-79 (1998). Bereby-Myer and Erev conducted three similar ex-
perinents differing only in the payoff given for correct and incorrect guesses. Id. In the first
experiment, participants were given four Israeli cents for a correct guess (and no penalty for an
incorrect guess). In the second experiment, two cents were given for a correct guess and a pen-
alty of two cents for an incorrect guess. Finally, in the third experiment, a penalty of four cents
for an incorrect guess was the only payoff. In all three variations participants failed to maximize
by opting exclusively for the more frequent outcome. See id at 278-79. See also Patrick Suppes
and Richard C. Atkinson, Markov Learning Models for Multiperson Interactions 197-98 (Stan-
ford 1960) (reporting individuals' suboptimal behavior in a probability matching experiment
involving monetary awards and penalties for correct and incorrect guesses).
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the subsequent flashings corresponded to the observed probability of
each color.
14
Additional experiments show that individuals react in a similar
manner when confronted with asymmetrical payoffs. In such cases, the
rates at which participants choose each option correspond to the ex-
pected gain. Rather than simply following the probability of each event,
participants also adjust for the different payoffs."
In a study conducted by Ward Edwards, participants were asked
to predict which of two lights ("left" or "right") would be turned on in
a game involving multiple rounds." Participants were awarded real
money for every correct guess, yet payoffs were asymmetric. The re-
ward for a correct "right" guess was three times the reward for a cor-
rect "left" guess (twelve cents and four cents, respectively). Analysis of
the last fifty rounds-after participants had observed and learned the
relevant probabilities-showed that participants "matched" their
guesses, while taking into account the different rewards." For example,
in one version of the experiment, the probability that each light would
appear was equal (that is, each light was on in 50 percent of the cases).
Although maximization required opting consistently for the "right"
14 See Jerome L. Myers, et al, Differential Memory Gains and Losses and Event Probability
in a Two-Choice Situation, 66 J Exp Psych 521 (1963) (observing the application of probability
matching when the distribution of the probabilities for the two binary options was 60 percent
versus 40 percent); W.K. Estes and J.H. Strughan, Analysis of a Verbal Conditioning Situation in
Terms of Statistical Learning Theory, 47 J Exp Psych 225,228-29,234 (1954) (reporting the use of
probability matching in experiments in which probability distribution was rather extreme, that is,
low probability for the less frequent option (15 percent) and high probability (85 percent) for the
more frequent option). For a recent experiment demonstrating the effect of probability matching
for a range of probabilities, see Michael H. Birnbaum, Online Studies of Probability Learning 3-
5, online at http://psych.fulierton.edu/mbirnbaum/papers/probLearn5.doc (visited Sept 19, 2005)
(varying randomly the probability between zero and one).
15 This behavior pattern is often labeled "matching law," which is expressed by the follow-
ing equation:
b] E(V1)
b2 E(V2)
where bi indicates the frequency of behavior one, b2 indicates the frequency of behavior two,
and E(VJ) and E(V2) indicate the expected value for behavior one and two, respectively. See, for
example, Louis N. Gray, Mark C. Stafford, and Irving Tallman, Rewards and Punishments in
Complex Human Choices, 54 Soc Psych Q 318, 318-20 (1991) (building on the "matching law"
literature to propose a refined model that includes both benefits and costs).
16 Ward Edwards, Reward Probability, Amount, and Information as Determiners of Sequen-
tial Two-Alternative Decisions, 52 J Exp Psych 177, 177-78 (1956).
17 Edwards's study involved several experimental groups, differing in the information and
type of feedback given to the participants. None of the groups, however, applied the maximiza-
tion rule, although some participants performed somewhat better than predicted by probability
matching. Id at 180-83. The results to which we refer above are those of the group under the
typical conditions of probability matching experiments, namely, a repeated choice involving two
binary, independent options (group "OL"). Id.
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guess-considering its higher payoff-participants adopted a mixed
approach. Following the expected reward for each guess, participants
distributed their guesses in a 3:1 ratio. For every three "right" guesses,
they entered one "left."'" Other studies provided similar results.'9
Signal detection and prediction of die rolling are rather artificial
environments. Additional studies have illustrated the effect of the
probability matching phenomenon in more natural settings, represent-
ing more realistic everyday dilemmas. For example, in a series of stud-
ies, participants were asked to assume the role of medical practitioners
making a series of diagnoses.20 Participants initially learned the corre-
lation between certain symptoms and the likelihood of a disease. Sub-
sequently, participants were presented with the description of the
symptoms of several patients and were requested to make as many
correct diagnoses as possible. To maximize the probability of correct
diagnoses, participants should have consistently chosen the outcome
(disease/not disease) more frequently associated with that particular
symptom pattern. Participants, however, made judgments that were
guided by the ratio of probabilities. In one study, for example, one par-
ticular symptom pattern predicted a disease with 78 percent probabil-
ity. To maximize the probability of correct diagnoses, participants
should have diagnosed any person with the relevant symptoms as suf-
fering from this disease. Yet participants in this experiment attributed
the disease to only 75 percent of the cases involving these 
symptoms. 21
18 Id. Suboptimal patterns were observed for different probability ratios. For example, with
these same payoffs, when the ratio between the "left" and "right" was set to 70 percent and 30
percent respectively, participants chose "left" roughly 47 percent of the time. Such a rate corre-
sponds to the relative expected payoff for each guess (70% x 2 = 1.4 cents, 30% x 6 = 1.8 cents).
Suboptimal behavior was also observed when the ratio for the "left" light was increased to 80
percent and 90 percent. Id.
19 For example, in Patt's study-composed of several experiments-individuals were
shown a rotating wheel with a stationary arrow in the middle. The wheel had parts in green and
red. Before each spin of the wheel, participants were requested to guess to which color the arrow
would eventually point. In the first experiment, the wheel had equal "red" and "green" parts. The
payoff for a correct "red" guess and a correct "green" guess was $2 and $3, respectively. Although
maximization requires guessing exclusively "green," participants chose green only 55 percent of
the time (and red 45 percent of the time). In the second experiment, the wheel was three-
quarters "red" (and one-quarter "green"). The payoffs for correct "red" and "green" guesses
remained $2 and $3, respectively. As such, expected payoff for a "red" guess was $1.50 (0.75 x
$2), compared to only $0.75 (0.25 x $3) for a "green" guess. Despite these values, participants
mixed their guesses. Matching the expected payoff from each guess, participants chose "red" only
66 percent of the time (and "green" 34 percent of the time). See Patt, 6 Risk, Dec & Policy at 111,
113-14 (cited in note 11).
20 For a description of these studies, see Daniel Friedman, et al, A Comparison of Learning
Models, 39 J Math Psych 164, 173-74 (1995).
21 See David R. Shanks, A Connectionist Account of Base-rate Biases in Categorization, 3
Connection Sci 143, 155-56 (1991) (showing that participants failed to maximize the number of
correct diagnoses).
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A recent experiment conducted by Alexandra Kincannon pro-
vides an illustration of the effect of probability matching in a legal
context." In Kincannon's experiment, participants were asked to guess
which of two parking lots-each containing several illegally parked
cars-would be ticketed. In each trial, only one of the parking lots was
ticketed. The experiment was designed so that the first lot was ran-
domly ticketed 75 percent of the time, while the other only 25 percent
of the time. After observing and learning the probabilities associated
with each parking lot for 100 trials, participants were requested to guess,
in each of the next 50 trials, which of the lots would be ticketed. The
results showed that participants did not follow the maximization rule.
Rather than consistently choosing the first lot, participants "matched"
their guesses. Participants, on average, chose the first lot roughly 75 per-
cent of the time."
The robustness of the probability matching phenomenon is fur-
ther indicated by its occurrence even when participants have been cued
about the correct strategy to pursue. Although encouraged to apply
the maximization rule, participants have nonetheless continued to mani-
fest a strong tendency to follow the strategy of probability matching. Two
studies provide illustrative examples.
In an experiment conducted by Hal Arkes, Robyn Dawes, and
Caryn Christensen, participants were presented with what was pur-
portedly a partial sample of a student's transcript. Each such tran-script comprised three grades, chosen randomly from the courses in
22 Alexandra P. Kincannon, The Roles of Context and Working Memory in Probability
Matching, poster presented at The 24th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (2002),
online at http://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/schunnlcogsci2OO2/program/posterschedule.html (visited Sept
19, 2005). For an abstract of the experiment design and results, see Alexandra P. Kincannon,
The Roles of Context and Working Memory in Probability Matching, online at http://www.
cognitivesciencesociety.org/confproc/gmu02/final-member-abstrs/kincannon.pdf (visited Sept 19,
2005).
23 The experiment involved two experimental groups. In addition to guessing which park-
ing lot would be ticketed, one experimental group was required to complete a secondary task
that required "working memory resources." This procedure was followed to examine whether
individuals with greater cognitive ability perform better on probability matching experiments.
The results showed that indeed individuals required to complete the two tasks simultaneously
performed worse than those required to only guess which parking lot would be ticketed. In the
first experimental group, participants chose the first lot roughly 80 percent of the time; in the
second experimental group, participants chose the first lot 70 percent of the time. These results
suggest that "analytic processing resources are needed to use the maximizing strategy." Kincan-
non, The Roles of Context and Working Memory in Probability Matching (cited in note 22). Both
groups, however, substantially failed to maximize.
24 Hal R. Arkes, Robyn M. Dawes, and Caryn Christensen, Factors Influencing the Use of a
Decision Rule in a Probabilistic Task, 37 Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes 93,93 (1986) (assessing
possible strategies aimed at incentivizing participants in a probabilistic task to use a "decision
rule" that will "enable ... them to choose correctly on a large proportion (70%) of judgment
tasks").
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which the student took part. Based on these reported grades, partici-
pants were asked to predict whether or not that student had graduated
with honors.n Participants were also provided with a "helpful hint."
According to the hint, only students whose sample transcript included
two or three As were "likely to have graduated with honors."26 To mo-
tivate maximization, participants were explicitly informed that the "help-
ful hint" leads to correct predictions in 70 percent of the cases, and
that 70 percent is "about as well as people can do.""
The experiment results showed that participants failed to opti-
mize their guesses.8 Rather than guessing "honors" only when the
sample transcript included two or three As, participants instead ap-
plied a "mixed" strategy, opting occasionally for the less probable pos-
sibility given the student's grades. Furthermore, Arkes, Dawes, and
Christensen found that providing monetary payoff for every correct
answer, and even warning the participants that "people who try to do
better than 70% on this task actually do a lot worse" did not cause
participants to apply the maximization rule. 9
A recent study conducted by Edmund Fantino and Ali Esfandiari,
involving a version of the flashing lights experiment, further indicates
that additional types of cues or combinations of such cues do not lead
25 Id at 96-97.
26 Id at 97.
27 Id. The actual percentages of "honors" for groups with zero, one, two or three As were
20, 40, 60 and 80, respectively. Accordingly, as explained to the participants, guessing "honors"
only when the sample transcript included two or three As ensured a hit rate of 70 percent. Use of
the "hint" was thus the only way (other than sheer luck) to perform well on the experiment.
28 Id at 99-100. As participants were shown forty transcripts, twenty-eight (70 percent) was
the optimal score. In practice, most experimental groups scored twenty or less. Id at 98-101.
Other experiments have provided similar results. Studies by Braveman and Fischer and by
McCracken, Osterhout, and Voss have demonstrated that informing participants that the se-
quence is random or that it is impossible to be correct on every trial did not result in maximiza-
tion. See Norman S. Braveman and Gloria J. Fischer, Instructionally Induced Strategy and Se-
quential Information in Probability Learning, 76 J Exp Psych 674, 675-76 (1968); J. McCracken,
C. Osterhaut, and James F Voss, Effects of Instructions in Probability Learning, 64 J Exp Psych
267, 270-71 (1962). Despite these instructions, most participants matched the probabilities. See
Braveman and Fischer, 76 J Exp Psych at 675-76; McCracken, Osterhaut, and Voss, 64 J Exp
Psych at 270-71.
29 Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen, 37 Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes at 97 (cited in note
24). Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen's experiment involved one control and three experimental
groups. The first experimental group ("innovative group") was encouraged "to surpass" the 70
percent level of performance by using its "keen perception"; the second group ("debiasing
group") was warned that abandoning the rule of maximization would drastically detract from its
performance; the third group ("no feedback") was provided no feedback until the end of the
experiment. Id at 95, 97. Another variable was the presence or absence of monetary incentives
for accurate judgments. The results of the different groups indicated that almost all participants
failed to follow the maximization rule. The only group that approximated optimization was the
"debiasing" group under the "no reward" condition. Id at 96-101.
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to efficient behavior.' ° For example, to provide an incentive for par-
ticipants to opt consistently for the more probable event, some par-
ticipants were instructed that winning the game requires guessing cor-
rectly only 75 percent of the time.' During the initial session, blue
lights were shown 75 percent of the time and green lights 25 percent
of the time. Nevertheless, participants continued to adopt a mixed
strategy. For every several blues, participants occasionally guessed
green. The experiment's results showed that providing such a cue had,
in practice, little effect." Both participants who were so instructed and
those who were not deviated from the maximization rule equally. On
average, participants in both groups chose blue (the frequent event) in
roughly 80 percent of the trials.3
Like Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen, Fantino and Esfandiari have
similarly found that even explicitly informing the participants of the
exact probabilities and cuing them about the best strategy to pursue
did not lead participants to adopt the maximization rule.'6 Other
means used by Fantino and Esfandiari to obtain maximization like-
wise showed no or limited effect.3 According to Fantino and Esfan-
diari, "the most compelling conclusion warranted by the present data
is that subjects' decision making in this task is not optimal."''
In sum, the experimental literature indicates that probability
matching is a robust phenomenon. As illustrated by numerous studies,
probability matching applies to a broad distribution of probabilities, to
gains as well as to losses, and to different types of payoffs. Probability
30 Fantino and Esfandiari, 56 Can J Exp Psych at 59 (cited in note 10) (exploring "addi-
tional variables that might affect the degree of probability matching, especially as a function of
being told the optimal score").
31 Id at60.
32 Id at 62 (concluding that "optimal behaviour did not occur whether or not subjects were
given [the maximization-incentivizing] instructions").
33 Id at 60.
34 Id at 60, 62 ("Optimal behaviour did not occur whether or not subjects were given [in-
structions that they could be correct on no more than 75 percent of trials]."). See also Birnbaum
and Wakcher, 34 Beh Rsrch Methods, Instruments, & Computers at 197 (cited in note 9) (con-
cluding from their results that despite "explicit instructions concerning the optimal strategy,
accompanied by information about the probability of events ... [participants'] performance still
falls well short of optimal behavior"). For another well-known experiment, see Richard C. Nies,
Effects of Probable Outcome Information on Two-Choice Learning, 64 J Exp Psych 430, 432
(1962) (reporting that providing participants the exact probability for each possible outcome
made only four of the 192 participants opt for the optimal strategy of always predicting the more
likely event).
35 To encourage maximization, some participants received extra payoffs for correct an-
swers, others were motivated by formatting the experiment as a competition, and some were also
requested to recommend the best strategy to other participants. Most groups' average rate of
choosing the frequent event was within the range of 80 to 90 percent. Neither group maximized.
Fantino and Esfandiari, 56 Can J Exp Psych at 60 (cited in note 10).
36 Id at 62.
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matching is detected not only in artificial environments but also in
settings approximating real world decisions. Finally, even when ac-
tively encouraged to maximize, individuals continue to apply the strat-
egy of probability matching.
B. Accounting for the Probability Matching Phenomenon
Why do people prefer the probability matching strategy to the
maximization rule? Researchers have proposed two principal theories.
First, individuals facing pure probabilistic outcomes often mistakenly
believe that they have identified a pattern according to which out-
comes occur. Consequently, "[s]o long as the subject believes that
some correct sequence will produce errorless performance, the fact
that one stimulus is reinforced more than the other is irrelevant and
has no effect on subsequent choices."37 While this explanation attrib-
utes probability matching to a cognitive misconception, other scholars
have suggested that probability matching is often a rational behavior.
Although suboptimal in some contexts, scholars have shown that, in
other contexts, probability matching is an optimizing strategy. Under
this theory, therefore, probability matching achieves maximization in
many cases.
1. Cognitive misconception.
Studies involving probabilistic outcomes have shown that indi-
viduals search for patterns even when such patterns are manifestly
absent.m Probability matching may thus reflect individuals' false con-
viction that purely probabilistic outcomes obey a certain predictable
order. Some probability matching experiments provide direct sup-
port for this hypothesis.
For example, in Richard Nies's study, participants were requested
to predict in each trial which color marble-red or blue-would roll
out of a box containing seventy blue and thirty red marbles. ' Follow-
ing the other experiments demonstrating probability matching, the
37 Robert W. Weisberg, Memory, Thought and Behavior 304 (Oxford 1980) (indicating that
prior information or experience may cause subjects to fail to solve probabilistic outcome problems).
38 See Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 81 (Cambridge 1994) (explaining that the
suboptimal behavior documented in probability matching experiments is due to the general tendency
of individuals to "look for hypotheses" (deterministic sequences) in probabilistic environments).
39 See, for example, Myers, Probability Learning and Sequence Learning at 184 (cited in
note 11) (concluding that probability matching results indicate the "propensity of subjects to
seek sequential cues and to incorporate such information into their decision making process");
Merrill M. Flood, Environmental Non-Stationarity in a Sequential Decision-Making Experiment,
in Mark R. Thrall, ed, Decision Process 287, 288 (Wiley 1954) (arguing that probability matching
occurs because subjects believe they can identify a predictable sequence).
40 Nies, 64 J Exp Psych at 430-31 (cited in note 34).
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results showed that participants strongly deviated from maximization.
Although participants were shown that the outcomes were utterly
random, forty-three out of ninety-six participants admitted in a post-
experiment questionnaire that they were "looking for a pattern.""
In John Yellott's study,"2 the experiment was manipulated to in-
clude two stages. The first stage was the traditional probability matching
experiment, in which participants had to predict which of two lights
would appear. The more frequent event appeared in 80 percent of the
trials. Participants matched their predictions to this frequency, and
failed to optimize. In the second stage, rather than randomization, the
researcher deliberately turned on the light that was chosen by the par-
ticipant, guaranteeing a 100 percent hit rate. Nonetheless, participants
continued, in 80 percent of the cases, to choose the light that had ap-
peared more frequently in the first stage. As argued by later research-
ers, these results suggest that "subjects had been seeking causal se-
quences throughout the experiment and were misled into thinking
that they had finally succeeded."4'3
Finally, the fact that both young children and animals tend to per-
form better than human adults in probability matching experiments
lends further support to this explanation." As it appears, children and
animals do better "because they are not as hindered by the tendency
to search for and posit causal hypotheses.
4 '
2. Heuristics.
Probability matching experiments typically involve uncorrelated
payoffs. The size of participants' reward for every correct answer is in-
dependent of the other participants' reward. Yet, in many real life con-
texts, individuals compete for scarce resources. Some scholars have
argued that probability matching can, under these circumstances, be a
41 Idat432.
42 John L. Yellott, Jr., Probability Learning with Noncontingent Success, 6 J Math Psych
541,563-74 (1969).
43 Fantino and Esfandiari, 56 Can J Exp Psych at 59 (cited in note 10).
44 For studies indicating that children of young age tend to apply the maximization rule
rather than probability matching, see, for example, Peter L. Derks and Marianne I. Paclisanu,
Simple Strategies in Binary Prediction by Children and Adults, 73 J Exp Psych 278, 284 (1967)
(finding that increased age correlates with increased disposition to match probabilities but also
with increased "ability to utilize sequential information"); Mary Helen Jones and Shephard
Liverant, Effects of Age Differences on Choice Behavior, 31 Child Dev 673, 680 (1960) (finding
that nursery school children were more likely than elementary school children to engage in
maximizing behavior).
45 George Wolford, Michael B. Miller, and Michael Gazzaniga, The Left Hemisphere's Role
in Hypothesis Formation, 20 RC64 J Neurosci 1, 1 (2000) (finding that "split-brain" individuals
probability match when using their left hemisphere, but approach maximization with their right
hemisphere).
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rational strategy.' Using insights from game theory, it has been shown
that opting for the less frequent event can be rational in competitive
environments with multiple agents. Because it is expected that most par-
ticipants will choose the more frequent event, this payoff will be dis-
tributed among many. In contrast, choosing the less frequent event prom-
ises the decisionmaker the whole payoff, undivided, when it materializes. 7
Consider, for example, the case of individuals competing for lim-
ited food resources. If all individuals choose the spot where previous
experience suggests food is to be found in abundance, then each may
get only a small share. In contrast:
The one mutant organism that sometimes chooses the spot with
less food would be better off. Natural selection will favor those
exceptional individuals who sometimes choose the less attractive
alternative. Thus, maximizing is not always an evolutionarily stable
strategy in situations of competition among individuals. Given
certain assumptions, probability matching may in fact be an evo-
lutionarily stable strategy, one that does not tend to create condi-
tions that select against it.8
Probability matching strategy can therefore be understood as a
simple heuristic device, appropriate to many of the environments in
which individuals interact. Some environments, however, are not com-
petitive. In such environments, application of the maximization rule
would have produced better results.
II. PROBABILITY MATCHING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
The preceding Part presented the broad experimental literature
concerning the probability matching phenomenon. This Part explores
the effect probability matching may have in the legal context. Part II.A
specifically illustrates the importance that probability matching has in
the design of an optimal law enforcement system. Part II.B discusses
the relevance of this analysis to the actual world.
46 See, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World
204-06 (Oxford 2000) (arguing that while the maximization rule is inefficient in social isolation,
probability matching can be the optimal strategy in many contexts involving social interaction).
47 See Gallistel, The Organization of Learning at 352-53 (cited in note 1).
48 Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking at 206 (cited in note 46).
49 This argument is in line with many other studies showing that people "make judgments
about probability on the basis of heuristic devices, responsive perhaps to high costs of inquiry
and decision, that work in many cases but that tend also to lead to systematic errors." Cass R.
Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U Chi L Rev 1175,1187 (1997).
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A. Law Enforcement Policymaking
Probability matching studies suggest that individuals facing a re-
peated choice involving probabilistic costs or benefits often behave as
"probability matchers" rather than as "maximizers." Probabilistic costs
are characteristic of law enforcement. Because it is impossible to place
a police officer next to every stop sign or to inspect each potentially
polluting individual, the imposition of criminal sanctions is inevitably
probabilistic. Probabilistic costs likewise characterize tort law; even
when detection is certain, it is often the case that the actual infliction
of harm is probabilistic.
Potential criminal-related behaviors and tort-related activities are
often also of a repetitive nature. Drivers repeatedly face the choice of
whether to illegally cross the same intersection, and polluters repeatedly
face the choice of whether to pollute. ° As such, probability matching has
important implications concerning optimal law enforcement policy. This
Part is devoted to examining the ways in which probability matching
can improve policymaking in the context of criminal law and tort law.
To illustrate, consider the following example. Assume that the po-
lice wish to deter drivers from crossing an intersection illegally. The
only sanction for crossing the intersection illegally is $100, and the
benefit of crossing it illegally without being caught is also $100."1 As-
sume, in addition, that drivers cross the intersection repeatedly. Fi-
nally, assume that a police car can be placed such that drivers who
cross the intersection cannot see it in advance. Thus, the drivers' be-
havior is determined solely by the sanction and by the subjective prob-
ability they attribute to the placing of the police car in the intersection.
Under the predictions of conventional legal analysis, if drivers are
risk neutral, it is sufficient to place the police car at the intersection in
51 percent of the cases (or at least to make drivers believe that it is
there 51 percent of the time). This guarantees that it would be irra-
tional to cross the intersection illegally since the expected costs of
crossing illegally are higher than the expected benefits.2 Placing the
car at the intersection less than 51 percent of the time is wasteful be-
50 It may be argued that, in the real world, under less sterile conditions, individuals do not treat
repeated choices as part of one sequence. We address this concern later. See text accompanying note 63.
51 Similarity of payoffs is assumed for arithmetic convenience. When payoffs are not equal,
probability matching follows the "matching law." See note 15 and accompanying text.
52 The benefit from crossing the intersection illegally, if not caught, is $100. If the police
officer is placed at the intersection 51 percent of the time, the expected benefit is $49 ((100% -
51%) x $100). The sanction for illegally crossing the intersection, if caught, is $100. If the police
officer is placed at the intersection 51 percent of the time, the expected cost is $51 (51% x $100).
Thus, placing the police officer at the intersection 51 percent of the time makes it unprofitable
for the drivers to illegally cross the intersection.
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cause drivers would never stop; placing the car more than 51 percent
of the time is also wasteful since the same deterrence can be achieved
with less investment.
Probability matching suggests otherwise. Placing the police car at the
intersection 51 percent of the time would cause drivers to cross the inter-
section legally in roughly 51 percent of the cases. Increasing the presence
of the police car to 70 percent of the time would therefore increase law-
abiding behavior. If the differential cost of placing the police car at the
intersection 70 percent rather than 51 percent of the time is sufficiently
low, it may be desirable on the part of the police to make this investment.3
To illustrate the relevance of probability matching to optimal in-
vestment in law enforcement, consider the following case. Assume that
500 vehicles cross the intersection every day. Assume that a car ille-
gally crossing the intersection imposes an expected social cost of $1.
Finally, assume that the marginal costs of placing a police officer in the
intersection increase as shown in the following table:
Table 1
Days on Which a Police Marginal Total
Officer is Placed at the Enforcement Enforcement
Intersection Costs Costs
First day $100 $100
Second day $400 $500
Third day $1500 $2000
Fourth day $3000 $5000
Conventional legal analysis would suggest, under these circum-
stances, that it is inefficient (assuming risk-neutral drivers) to place a
police officer at the intersection. As drivers' expected costs from cross-
ing the intersection illegally are equal to their expected benefit, they
will cross the intersection illegally unless it is more likely than not that
53 This result, as predicted by probability matching, is based on the assumption that indi-
viduals are risk neutral. Once risk aversion is taken into account, the prediction would be differ-
ent and would be determined both by attitudes to risk as well as by probability matching.
54 Increasing the presence of the police in the intersection can be achieved either by re-
quiring police officers to work more or by recruiting additional personnel. Under both alterna-
tives the marginal cost of enforcement is likely to increase. Additional working hours demands
paying police officers overtime; additional personnel requires both recruiting individuals with
higher opportunity costs and significant investment in their training. See, for example, Henrik
Lando and Steven Shavell, The Advantage of Focusing Law Enforcement Effort, 24 Intl Rev L &
Econ 209,216 (2004) (arguing that "for a variety of reasons, it will often be difficult-for the num-
ber of enforcement agents to be increased at a constant cost," and at least in the short run the
marginal cost of additional enforcement is increasing); Joshua C. LaGrange, Note, Law, Econom-
ics and Drugs: Problems with Legalization Under a Federal System, 100 Colum L Rev 505,515 (2000)
(claiming that "the marginal cost of enforcement is increasing").
1213
The University of Chicago Law Review
they will be caught. Therefore, deterrence will be achieved only if a po-
lice officer is placed at the intersection at least four days a week (more
than 50 percent of the time). In weekly terms, this would indeed save
$3500 in social costs (7 x $500), but would require investing $5000
($100 + $400 + $1500 + $3000) in enforcement. Any attempt to place a
police officer less than four days would be a waste of money, as drivers
would not be deterred from crossing the intersection illegally.
In contrast, if people are "probability matchers," placing a police
officer at the intersection for two days would be efficient. Every day
that a policeman is placed deters 500 vehicles from crossing the inter-
section illegally, saving $500 in social costs. Drivers, noting that the
police officer is present one-seventh of the time, will obey the light at
the same rate, that is, one day a week. Given that the costs of placing a
police officer for the first and second day are each lower than $500, a
policymaker ought to place a police officer in the intersection for two
days. This example illustrates that a policymaker relying on the predic-
tions of probability matching may invest more in enforcement than a
policymaker relying on the predictions of conventional legal analysis."
In the last example it was assumed that social costs produced by
criminal behavior (crossing the intersection illegally) remain fixed for
every illegal act. In some contexts, however, the marginal social cost gen-
erated by illegal behavior is expected to increase with additional levels of
the activity. Under such conditions, even if one assumes that marginal
enforcement costs are fixed, probability matching may again recommend
a different policy than that mandated by conventional legal scholarship.
Consider, for example, the case of pollution. Assume that the mar-
ginal social harm increases with every additional unit of contamination.
While one unit of pollution is harmless, the second unit causes a harm of
$100, the third unit causes a harm of $200, and so forth. To illustrate, as-
sume that there is an individual who produces the same unit of pollution
each day, seven days a week. Assume also that the only sanction for each
instance of illegal pollution is $100 and that the individual gains $100
from each instance of pollution. Finally, assume that the cost of employ-
ing a detection team to identify pollution is $550 a day. The following ta-
ble describes marginal and total social costs resulting from pollution.
55 A small alteration of the assumptions can also illustrate that probability matching can
justify a lesser investment in enforcement. Assume that the expected social cost of a car crossing the
intersection illegally is $2 rather than only $1. Traditional legal analysis, under this condition, supports
the placement of the police officer at the intersection. Placing the police officer for four days a week
would deter drivers from crossing the intersection illegally. It would save $7000 ($500 x 2 x 7) in
social costs, outweighing enforcement costs ($5000). Probability matching, however, indicates that
the police officer should be placed for only two days. Because enforcement costs of the third and
fourth days are $1500 and $3000 respectively, such enforcement is inefficient given that the social
cost saved for each day is only $1000 (2 x $500).
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Table 2
Instances of Marginal Total
Pollution per Week Social Costs Social Costs
1 $0 $0
2 $100 $100
3 $200 $300
4 $300 $600
5 $400 $1000
6 $500 $1500
7 $600 $2100
Under these circumstances, traditional legal scholarship would
recommend no enforcement. Because the benefit to the individual
from pollution is equal to his cost, this individual would pollute only if
it is more likely than not that he would not be caught. Deterrence,
therefore, would be achieved only if a detection team is employed at
least four days a week. In weekly terms, operating the detection unit
saves $2100 in social costs, but would require investing $2200 ($550 x
4) in enforcement. Any attempt to employ the detection unit for less
than four days would be a waste of money, as the individual would not
be deterred from polluting.
Probability matching, in contrast, mandates operating the detec-
tion unit once a week. Such a level of enforcement is expected to in-
duce the individual to refrain from polluting one out of every seven
times; the individual would pollute only six times rather than seven.
Consequently, $600 would be saved, which outweighs the enforcement
costs ($550).-
56 A small change in the assumptions can illustrate that probability matching may also
justify a smaller investment in enforcement than that demanded by conventional analysis. As-
sume that the marginal social costs of pollution increase more rapidly, so that the first unit of
pollution is harmless, the second unit causes harm of $150 (rather than $100), the third unit
causes harm of $300 (rather than $200), and so forth. The following table summarizes the social
costs resulting from pollution under this modified assumption.
Instances of Pollution Marginal Total
per Week Social Costs Social Costs
1 $0 $0
2 $150 $150
3 $300 $450
4 $450 $900
5 $600 $1500
6 $750 $2250
7 $900 $3150
Traditional legal scholarship, under this condition, supports the employment of the detection
unit. Operating the detection unit for four days would deter the individual from polluting. Con-
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To conclude, the preceding analysis demonstrates that if either
the marginal costs of enforcement or the marginal costs of illegal ac-
tivity (or both) are not constant, probability matching and traditional
cost-benefit analysis dictate different enforcement policies. Differ-
ences may cut both ways: probability matching may justify higher as
well as lower investment in enforcement than suggested by traditional
legal scholarship.
B. Probability Matching and Actual Legal Contexts
The analysis in Part II.A demonstrates the effect that probability
matching may have on optimal law enforcement policymaking. There
are several factors, however, that may limit the impact of probability
matching in actual legal contexts. This Part investigates these factors,
and suggests that probability matching is nevertheless relevant to the
design of enforcement.
Arguably, the "real world" differs in several respects from labora-
tory environments. First, in contrast to laboratory experiments, in the
real world individuals are not always aware of the probabilities of de-
tection or the severity of the sanctions. It is possible that probability
matching does not occur in contexts involving significant uncertainty.
Second, legal contexts may involve cases in which the probability that
the cost or benefit will materialize is small. In contrast, most of the
probability matching experiments involved probabilities of intermedi-
ate size. Studies have shown that individuals misconceive the likeli-
hood of events with small probabilities. 7 It is unclear whether prob-
ability matching also occurs in this range of probabilities. Third, the
experiments involved a repetitive set of choices, iterated many times
in a very short period. As the results show, individuals lump their deci-
sions together as if these choices are part of one sequence of events. It
is unclear whether people in the real world, under less sterile circum-
stances, perceive their decisions as part of one sequence. Fourth, in the
actual world, individuals may possess insurance. Insurance eliminates
the probabilistic nature of costs and consequently it eliminates the
sequently, $3150 in social costs would be saved, which outweighs enforcement costs ($550 x 4 =
$2200). Probability matching, however, indicates that the detection unit should be employed for
only three days. Individuals will now pollute only four days per week, leading to a savings of
$2250 ($900 + $750 + $600) in social costs at a price of $2200. Employing the detection unit for a
fourth day costs $550, but would save only $450 in social costs.
57 See, for example, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of
Reason Rule Our Minds 130-32 (Wiley 1994) (Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini and Keith Botsford,
trans) (reviewing studies showing individuals' tendency to overreact to small risks, while-at the
very far extreme of the probability scale-they tend to ignore probabilities completely).
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circumstances necessary for probability matching." Fifth, as the ex-
periments of probability matching involved only individuals, it is un-
clear whether corporations also behave as probability matchers. These
are important concerns that may limit the applicability of probability
matching or may suggest that further experimental research is re-
quired. Even so, the existing data concerning probability matching
suggests that it does have significant real-world predictive power.
First, as long as individuals have subjective convictions concern-
ing the probability or size of sanctions, experiments indicate that they
will act as probability matchers. In most of the experiments described
above, participants were not explicitly told the probabilities of the
events. Probability matching thus occurred despite a degree of uncer-
tainty with respect to the probabilities. Similarly, in the legal context,
the absence of explicit information regarding the probabilities of de-
tection should not diminish the relevance of probability matching.9
Second, as stated earlier, the distribution of probabilities was
found to have no bearing on study participants' behavior. These stud-
ies demonstrate that probability matching occurs irrespective of changes
in the relevant probabilities. ' Moreover, data show that at least in
some contexts individuals face significant probabilities of being de-
tected and convicted." The experiments described above are directly
relevant to these contexts. Even if most criminals committing a par-
ticular crime are indeed subjected to low probabilities, certain classes
of criminals, such as repeat offenders, are subject to higher probabili-
ties of detection-arguably similar to those examined in the probabil-
ity matching experiments.62 Additional experiments are required in
order to determine whether probability matching occurs in contexts
involving small probabilities.
58 It is possible that probability matching may influence individuals' incentives to purchase
insurance in the first place. As no data yet exist on this point, additional research would be re-
quired to determine the exact effects.
59 For a policymaker, individuals' high degree of uncertainty with respect to the relevant
probabilities may disrupt the possibility to regulate their behavior. If individuals are repeat
players, however, they are more likely to develop accurate beliefs concerning the relevant prob-
abilities.
60 See text accompanying note 14.
61 See, for example, Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges:
The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J L & Econ 141, 197 (1995) (arguing that detection of
market power manipulations is "very high"); Mark A. Cohen and David T. Scheffman, The Anti-
trust Sentencing Guideline: Is the Punishment Worth the Costs?, 27 Am Crim L Rev 331, 349
(1989) (showing that, at least for some crimes, the probability of detection is much higher than
conventionally assumed and ranges from one in three to one in four).
62 See, for example, David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Re-
peat Offenders, 110 Yale L J 733, 742-53 (2001) (suggesting that at least in some contexts repeat
offenders are subjected to higher probabilities of detection).
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Third, some experiments involved realistic settings in which par-
ticipants were presented with the repetitive choices not only in one
condensed session but over longer periods. For example, in one study
participants played for eight days with long breaks between each ex-
perimental session. The results show that probability matching oc-
curred under these circumstances, suggesting that participants indeed
considered these decisions not in isolation but rather as part of one
sequence. Such circumstances approximate real life legal contexts.
Fourth, insurance is not available against most criminal sanctions
and, even when insurance is available, not all individuals are fully in-
sured against all types of tort or other forms of noncriminal liability.?
Moreover, even when insurance exists, it is often the case that the in-
sured is required to pay some amount as a copayment.
Fifth, more research is admittedly needed in order to examine the
applicability of probability matching to corporations. Existing data,
however, provide some evidence suggesting that corporations are also
subject to cognitive biases, possibly including the tendency to match
probabilities. A number of studies show that suboptimal behaviors can
also be identified among corporate managers and personnel. Some of
these behaviors stem directly from failures to assess or correctly per-
ceive probabilistic outcomes.6
63 See, for example, Edwards, 52 J Exp Psych at 170-73 (cited in note 16) (reporting prob-
ability matching in an experiment consisting of daily sessions, with long separating intervals). See
also Friedman, et al, Two-Choice Behavior at 290 (cited in note 7) (documenting probability
matching in an experiment consisting of three separate daily sessions). Moreover, if probability
matching is not a cognitive misconception but rather a heuristic device, such behavior is ex-
pected in real life contexts. Although in most cases it will maximize individuals' payoff, in other
contexts such a strategy will be suboptimal. See text accompanying notes 46-47.
64 Liability insurers typically exclude coverage for injury or damage intentionally caused
by the insured. See Robert H. Jerry II, Understanding Insurance Law 479 (Matthew Bender 3d
ed 2002). In addition, policies generally exclude "criminal acts." The criminal acts exclusion is
broader because it affects even unintentional crimes. See, for example, Daniel C. Eidsmoe and
Pamela K. Edwards, Home Liability Coverage: Does the Criminal Acts Exclusion Work Where the
"Expected or Intended" Exclusion Failed?, 5 Conn Ins L J 707, 718 (1998-99) ("[I]t is clear that
the criminal acts exclusion is intentionally broader in scope than the expected or intended lan-
guage. The criminal acts exclusion excludes coverage for unintentional, as well as intentional
criminal acts."). See also Allstate Insurance Co v Norris, 795 F Supp 272,273 (SD Ind 1992) (up-
holding an exclusion of coverage for criminally reckless acts).
65 See, for example, Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71
U Cin L Rev 1233, 1257-93 (2003) (examining the cognitive factors surrounding the Enron
board's decisionmaking); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 Am Bus L J
417,427-33 (2003) (arguing that cognitive biases played a major role in Enron's demise); Robert
Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for
Its Future, 51 Duke L J 1397, 1414 (2002) (observing that "various heuristics and biases often
prevent employees from maximizing their employers' goals even when they seek to do so");
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U Pa L Rev 101, 130-48 (1997)
(demonstrating the prevalence of cognitive biases in corporate decisionmaking).
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Finally, empirical data indicate the prevalence of probability
matching outside the laboratory. Several researchers have linked indi-
viduals' suboptimal behaviors observed in reality with the strategy of
probability matching. For example, it has been shown that some adoles-
cent subjects believe "they should wear seatbelts most of the time" be-
cause the belts are generally helpful "but can sometimes cause harm."'6
Empirical research regarding the conduct of professional physicians
provides another illustration. 67 A number of studies have indicated
that doctors often fail to maximize when required to form their diag-
noses based on patients' symptoms.{ Rather than consistently opting
for the more probable diagnosis, physicians appear to apply different
personal decisionmaking methods that result in a substantially fewer
number of correct diagnoses. Even when explicitly shown otherwise,
studies indicated that physicians tend to believe they can somehow
outperform the maximization rule.6' Additional research has found
similar behavior with respect to other professionals. Although aware
of the probabilities, accountants, psychologists, and others who were
given relevant information and required to form their judgment have
been shown to occasionally predict the less probable outcome." More-
over, although statistical methods have been shown consistently to be
capable of bringing substantial improvements in the accuracy of
repetitive diagnostic decisions, professionals continue to use a subjec-
tive, clinical judgment approach when making predictive decisions."
Admittedly, in practice, a law enforcement system that aims at
achieving optimal results by taking into account the effect of probabil-
ity matching might face complex informational hurdles. Consider again
the traffic example. Roads might be used simultaneously by frequent
drivers as well as drivers who use the road only occasionally. Thus,
only some of the drivers are expected to behave as probability match-
ers. Calculating the optimal investment in law enforcement requires
identification of the relative number of drivers belonging to each one of
66 See Gal and Baron, 2 Thinking and Reasoning at 82 (cited in note 6).
67 See Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen, 37 Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes at 108 (cited in
note 24) (reviewing several studies examining doctors' strategies in forming medical diagnoses
based on patients' conditions).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 For an overview of the literature, see William M. Grove and Paul E. Meehl, Comparative
Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Predic-
tion Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 Psych, Pub Policy & L 293,293-95 (1996)
(documenting the major studies since 1928 that examine the predictive abilities of professionals).
71 See, for example, John A. Swets, Robyn M. Dawes, and John Monahan, Psychological
Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions, 1 Psychological Sci in the Pub Int 1, 20-23 (2000)
(discussing the benefits of statistical prediction rules as well as the major rr qons that clinicians
resist using them).
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these groups. Although this information is sometimes available, at
other times the costs involved in finding this information might be
prohibitive.7
Adjusting investment in law enforcement to account for indi-
viduals' tendency to use probability matching is one way the law may
achieve efficient deterrence. Another possibility is to use a flexible
regime of sanctions, sensitive to the effects of probability matching.
Unlike ex ante law enforcement, information concerning the frequency
of individuals' behavior is often available at the time of the imposition
of the sanctions. The use of flexible sanctions, however, mandates that
the legal system differentiate between wrongdoing that is part of a
sequence of misconduct and wrongdoing that is committed only spo-
radically. The next Part shows that both punitive damages in torts and
escalating penalties in criminal law often serve as mechanisms to
achieve such a differentiation. Both regimes provide the necessary
incentives to deter those individuals most likely to behave as probabil-
ity matchers.
III. ESCALATING SANCTIONS
Individuals who repeatedly engage in misconduct are often sub-
jected to augmented sanctions. The following analysis suggests that
this legal practice can eliminate, to a large extent, the inefficiencies
resulting from the phenomenon of probability matching. Such a legal
regime provides the necessary level of deterrence, both for individuals
who are expected to act as probability matchers and for those who are
likely to behave as maximizers.
Part III.A investigates the treatment of repeated misconduct in
tort law and shows that punitive damages have historically been asso-
ciated with repeated misconduct. Part III.B, which discusses the use of
escalating penalties for repeat offenders, demonstrates the prevalence
of this practice in the criminal context.
A. Punitive Damages
Courts have traditionally imposed overcompensatory damages on
defendants who act on a repetitive basis. The following paragraph,
72 Such information can be obtained rather easily, for example, on toll highways. With the
increase in drivers' use of devices such as EZ-Pass, information concerning the identity of drivers
using the road can be obtained without substantial cost. See, for example, the recent discussion
(from Aug 18,2003) in the California Senate, suggesting that information on drivers' use of EZ-
Pass and similar devices offers the State data on the identities of road users. RFID Technology
and Pervasive Computing, Informational Hearing of the California Senate Subcommittee on
New Technologies, August 18, 2003, online at http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/sen/comiittee/standing/
energyLhome/archive hearings.2003-2004/8-18-03transcript.htm (visited Sept 19,2005).
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taken from a century-old decision of a Georgia court, provides an il-
lustrative example. In its decision to award punitive damages to a plain-
tiff whose crops were harmed by sparks from railroad locomotives, the
Georgia court stated that:
We can suppose other negligent acts by a defendant for a single
tort, which, while not subjecting him to punitive damages, might
by frequent repetition ... make him liable for punitive damages.
For instance, If A. and B. pass each other daily, and A. negligently
stumbles against B. and injures him, A. would only be liable to B.
for B.'s actual damages. But if, every time they met, or every
other time, or once a week, or once a month, A. should negli-
gently stumble against B. and injure him, would not this constant
repetition of A.'s tort raise a jury question as to whether B. was
entitled to punitive damages to deter A. from continuing his neg-
ligence? Suppose, again, that A., when passing on his regular
daily route by B.'s premises, should carelessly and negligently
throw a lighted cigarette, or cigar-stump, on B.'s lawn, and
thereby injure and burn B.'s grass and flowers; A. would be liable
for actual damages only; but if this occurred fifteen times within
two years should not B. be allowed punitive damages to deter A.
from continuing his careless and tortious conduct?73
This ruling is repeated in numerous other cases." These cases in-
dicate that the frequency of the wrong has been regarded as an impor-
tant consideration in the decision to award punitive damages.
Although the law concerning punitive damages has evolved," the
conviction that the repeated occurrence of the misconduct provides
justification for awarding punitive damages has been reasserted and
76
reaffirmed by contemporary decisions, as well as by contemporary
73 Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co v McElmurray, 16 Ga App 504, 85 SE 804,
808-09 (1915).
74 For early decisions holding that punitive damages should be imposed when the defen-
dant's tortious behavior is recurring, see, for example, Gila Water Co v Gila Land & Cattle Co, 30
Ariz 569, 249 P 751,754-55 (1926) (stating that "repeated diversions of plaintiff s water, prevent-
ing it from carrying on its farming," justify the award of "exemplary damages"); Sorg v Fredrick,
255 Pa 617, 100 A 481,483 (1917) (holding that the lower court was justified in awarding punitive
damages when there was evidence of "repeated wrongful acts" on the part of defendants); De-
troit Daily Post Co v McArthur, 16 Mich 447,455 (1868) (holding that repeated instances of libel
justify the imposition of "increased damages").
75 For the development of the punitive damages doctrine, see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the
Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs,
87 Minn L Rev 583, 614-29 (2003) (tracing the imposition of punitive damages from medieval
England to twentieth century America).
76 See, for example, Pulla v Amoco Oil Co, 72 F3d 648,659-60 (8th Cir 1995) (justifying its
decision to reverse the award of punitive damages on the grounds that "[i]n the instant case,
there is no evidence or indication that [the misconduct] reflected a company policy or practice
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commentators." More recently, the Supreme Court has had two op-
portunities to address the conditions for the imposition of punitive
damages, and both cases highlighted the relevance of a prior "pattern
of misconduct" as a relevant consideration. 7 Finally, the relevance of
repetitive misconduct has been recognized by state legislation. State
laws often explicitly condition the imposition of punitive damages on
the defendant's recurring behavior."
This practice, however, cannot be explained by the conventional
rationales purporting to justify the practice of punitive damages. Legal
scholarship has suggested two principal explanations -based on either
deterrence or retribution-why it might be justifiable to charge the
defendant more than the harm she actually caused.n Neither, however,
seems to account for this long-established practice of awarding puni-
tive damages in cases of repeated misconduct.
The first justification connects the practice of punitive damages
to the problem of insufficient deterrence. Concerned with cases in
.... [W]e would view Amoco's conduct in a more critical light if Pulla had presented any evi-
dence rebutting [the] assertion that this was an isolated and rare incident"); Harris v Soley, 2000
Me 150, 756 A2d 499, 507 ("It is well established that prior misconduct by a defendant that is
similar to the misconduct giving rise to liability is relevant to the determination of punitive dam-
ages."); Wilson v IBP, Inc, 558 NW2d 132, 147-48 (Iowa 1996) (supporting a punitive damages
award of $2 million when presented with evidence of repeated and ongoing employer miscon-
duct).
77 See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.11(2) (West 2d ed 1993) ("Repeated miscon-
duct, or a policy of misconduct ... is often an element in punitive damages cases."). See also
Daniel M. Weddle, A Practitioner's Guide to Litigating Punitive Damages after BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 Drake L Rev 661,667 (1999) (observing that repeated misconduct is "a
significant factor among courts deciding whether to uphold high punitive damage awards").
78 In BMW of North America, Inc v Gore, 517 US 559 (1996), the Court emphasized that
"[i]n this regard, it is also significant that there is no evidence that BMW persisted in a course of
conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful on even one occasion, let alone repeated occasions."
Id at 579. Similarly, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v Campbell, 538 US 408, 419
(2003), the Court held that whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident" is an important consideration in imposing punitive damages
79 See, for example, DC Code Ann § 28-3813 (2001) (providing that punitive damages may
be awarded for "wilful and repeated violations" of consumer protection laws); Idaho Code § 48-
608 (Michie 2003) (providing that imposition of punitive damages for unlawful trade practices is
conditioned on "repeated" violations); Iowa Code Ann § 91E.4 (West 1996) (providing that "an
employer who, through repeated violation ... demonstrates a pattern of abusive recruitment
practices may be ordered to pay punitive damages"); 22 Me Rev Stat Ann § 2697 (West 1964)
(providing that punitive damages can be imposed only for "willful or repeated" violations of the
law concerning profiteering).
80 The Restatement, reciting both rationales, holds that punitive damages are "awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him
from similar conduct in the future." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1979). See also
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L J 347, 356-57 (2003)
(arguing that "courts and academic commentators on the whole do agree that there are two
prevailing justifications for punitive damages: punishment (or retribution) and deterrence");
Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 204 (West 1973) (noting that punitive
damages are usually awarded as a punishment or deterrent).
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which the plaintiff may not sue, legal scholars (especially in the law
and economics tradition) have suggested that punitive damages serve
to deter tortfeasors in contexts in which underenforcement is ex-
pected.8' Under this first explanation, punitive damages are needed to
supplement compensatory damages when the latter are not sufficient
to provide optimal incentives to tortfeasors. Scholars have provided
several reasons why, in the absence of punitive damages, injurers may
be underdeterred. First, victims may not be aware of or may have dif-
ficulty proving some of the necessary elements of the wrong. Second,
even when the plaintiff is aware of all of the necessary facts and pos-
sesses evidence to support her claim, the costs of litigation might be
prohibitive. Finally, a special relationship, such as when the plaintiff is
the employee or the patient of the defendant, may discourage her from
suing.8 Imposing punitive damages in the limited cases where suits are
filed serves to compensate for the cases in which they are not."
This explanation, however, fails to justify the rule that repeated
misconduct is an important consideration in awarding punitive dam-
ages. There is no reason to believe that the probability of escaping
liability is higher in cases of repeated misconduct in comparison to
cases in which the defendant acts only once. The opposite may be true:
it is possible that repeated misconduct would inevitably be detected
and would lead to a successful award of compensatory damages.
Likewise, it is possible that a single, nonrepeated negligent act would
have a high probability of escaping liability. Without empirical evi-
dence suggesting otherwise, it seems that the chance of the commence-
81 For an elaborate discussion, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Dam-
ages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv L Rev 869 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages are
necessary when there is a significant likelihood that the wrongdoer will escape liability). Some
courts have explicitly embraced this rationale. See, for example, BMW, 517 US at 582 ("A higher
ratio [of punitive to compensatory damages] may ... be justified in cases in which the injury is
hard to detect."); Perez v Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc, 223 F3d 617, 621 (7th Cir 2000) ("Frauds
often escape detection, and the need to augment deterrence of concealable offenses is a principal
justification of punitive damages."); Ciraolo v City of New York, 216 F3d 236,245 (2d Cir 2000)
("Such a [multiplier] conception of punitive damages, again, is not new, and it has been recog-
nized by courts as well as scholars."); Zazt! Designs v L'Orgal SA, 979 F2d 499,508 (7th Cir 1992)
("Punitive damages are appropriate when some wrongful conduct evades detection; a multiplier
then both compensates and deters.").
82 See Polinsky and Shavell, 111 Harv L Rev at 888 (cited in note 81) (discussing reasons
why wrongdoers escape liability, thus necessitating the imposition of punitive damages). See also
Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 244-45 (Harvard 2004) (discussing
reasons why damage awards must exceed losses in order to effectively deter wrongdoers); Sharkey,
113 Yale LJ at 366-67 (cited in note 80) (discussing reasons for tort plaintiffs' underenforcement).
83 To their credit, Polinsky and Shavell concede that their model cannot explain existing
doctrine. Their suggestion is aimed at initiating reconsideration of existing doctrine rather than
explaining it. See Polinsky and Shavell, 111 Harv L Rev at 896-900 (cited in note 81).
1223
1224 The University of Chicago Law Review [72:1197
ment of a lawsuit is not correlated with the frequency of the defendant's
behaviorY
Empirical studies as well as courts' decisions indicate that punitive
damages are often imposed as a result of a strong ethical sentiment.
Overcompensatory damages reflect the jury's or judge's moral con-
demnation with regard to the behavior of the defendant. Under this
second, nonconsequentialist explanation for punitive damages, the con-
ventional requirement for recurring conduct seems logical. An individ-
ual who is repeatedly engaged in harm-causing behavior appears more
reprehensible than an individual who only occasionally injures others."
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co v Campbell, however, seems to require more than
just a clear indication concerning the defendant's moral fault. As the
Court explained, for the purpose of imposing punitive damages, repeat
behavior must be composed of "similar" acts, with each act "repli-
cat[ing] the prior transgressions." A plaintiff would not be awarded
punitive damages simply because the defendant committed a series of
wrongs, unless the wrongs are sufficiently similar to each other. A
plaintiff showing that the defendant was involved in a series of wrong-
84 For some other, less-discussed, economic rationales for awarding punitive damages, see
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 245-47 (cited in note 82). None of these
explanations, however, are relevant to the issue at stake.
85 For an early case stating that reprehensible conduct justifies overcompensatory dam-
ages, see, for example, Day v Woodworth, 54 US 363, 371 (1851) ("It is a well-established princi-
ple of the common law, that ... a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindic-
tive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the meas-
ure of compensation to the plaintiff."). Several experimental studies show that some believe
punitive damages should be restricted to instances in which the behavior of the defendant was
outrageous. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan L
Rev 1153 (2002) (reporting the results of a number of experiments in which mock juries imposed
punitive damages when the conduct of the defendant was reprehensible, but not when underen-
forcement was evident); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People
Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J Legal Stud 237 (2000) (observing that individuals do not impose
higher damage awards in hypothetical cases where detection is less likely and do not support
administrative and judicial policies that seek to increase penalties in response to the probabilities
of detection).
86 As far as instances of intentional torts are concerned, repeated behavior clearly reflects
morally blameworthy behavior. In cases, however, in which the defendant appears only negligent,
the moral reprehensibility argument is less straightforward. Even so, recurring acts of negligence
may indicate that the defendant's acts are not truly innocent. See Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Puni-
tive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive:An Economic Perspective, 40 Emory L J 303,338 (1991)
("It may be that repeated misconduct speaks to the issue of the defendant's intent, since a pat-
tern of wrongful acts might indicate that the defendant has not made a mistake.").
87 538 US 408 (2003).
88 Id at 423. For an earlier decision of the Court reciting the "similarity" requirement, see
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co v Haslip, 499 US 1, 21-22 (1991) (explaining that "the existence
and frequency of similar past conduct" should be an important factor in courts' decisions to
impose punitive damages).
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ful behaviors, but such that are not clearly similar, would not be enti-
tled to punitive damages.
This requirement that the wrongs be similar to each other is in-
consistent with the rationale based on the moral condemnation of the
defendant. Although a defendant who repeatedly engages in miscon-
duct of different types might well be more reprehensible than a de-
fendant who repeatedly engages in misconduct of one type, punitive
damages will be imposed exclusively on the latter.8 Reprehensibility,
therefore, cannot explain why courts differentiate between the case in
which the defendant committed a series of wrongs that are different,
and cases in which the defendant committed a series of wrongs that
are similar.
Probability matching, in contrast, can suggest at least a partial ex-
planation for the differentiation between these two cases. It provides a
deterrence-motivated rationale, but one that is unrelated to the con-
ventional underenforcement explanation. While the latter focuses on
the plaintiff-and ties punitive damages to cases in which he will not
sue-probability matching focuses on the defendant. Punitive dam-
ages might be necessary in cases in which defendants are likely to be-
have as probability matchers.
For illustration, consider an activity that causes harm 60 percent
of the time. When harm does not occur, the benefit to the defendant is
$100. When the harm materializes, the defendant derives no benefit
and the damage from the activity to the plaintiff is likewise $100. Set-
ting damages to the actual harm ($100) is enough to deter risk-neutral
individuals who face a one-time opportunity to perform the activity.
As the expected costs outweigh the benefit from the activity, a rational
individual would avoid the activity. If individuals face the choice re-
peatedly, however, such a remedy would be insufficient. The tendency
to "match the probabilities" would cause such individuals to adopt a
mixed approach. More particularly, under these circumstances, indi-
viduals would perform the risky activity four out of ten times. Impos-
ing substantial punitive damages on repeat tortfeasors serves to coun-
terbalance the effect caused by probability matching. Because the ex-
pected costs become very high, such defendants will avoid the activity.'
89 See Erwin Chemerinsky and Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning of US
Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages' Cases, 36 Ariz St L J 513,523 (2004):
What State Farm did do is clarify under what circumstances "other acts" evidence is consti-
tutionally relevant and permissible in determining whether punitive damages should be
awarded and, if so, in what amount. The touchstone of using "other acts" evidence is the
similarity of those acts to the conduct that specifically harmed or threatened the plaintiff
90 Consider, for example, the expected behavior of the defendant if she is required to pay
$100,000 (rather than only $100) when damage materializes. As the experimental literature
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This rationale can also explain why defendants who engage in re-
peated misconduct that is not of a similar type should not be subjected
to punitive damages. Probability matching occurs when people regard
a series of discrete acts as part of one sequence. Such a perception is
expected only if the individuals face a similar choice. A defendant in-
volved in a series of unrelated wrongs is not likely to behave as a
probability matcher. Such a defendant is expected to be deterred by
ordinary compensatory damages.
To be sure, different cases in which punitive damages were awarded
indicate that the award of punitive damages serves several purposes."
This Part, however, suggests that among these purposes, the award of
punitive damages addresses the inefficiencies resulting from the phe-
nomenon of probability matching. Punitive damages create a legal re-
gime that differentiates between individuals that are expected to maxi-
mize and those who are likely to match probabilities. It enables courts to
impose higher sanctions on the latter without overdeterring the former.
Probability matching may also require adjustment in the level of
the criminal sanctions imposed on recidivist offenders. The next Part
suggests that the widespread use of escalating penalties represents such
an adjustment.
B. Escalating Criminal Sanctions
The legal system punishes repeat offenders more severely than
nonrepeat offenders." An offender committing a crime twice often re-
ceives a harsher punishment than a first-time offender, and an offender
committing the offense repeatedly is likely to be sanctioned even
more severely.9 Since Gryger v Burk -in which the Supreme Court
shows, when payoffs are asymmetrical, the rates at which a risk-neutral individual will choose
each option are equal to the corresponding expected payoff See note 15. Given that the defen-
dant faces a 40 percent chance to gain $100 (40% x $100 = $40) and a 60 percent chance to pay
$100,000 (60% x $100,000 = $60,000)-a ratio of 1:1500-the defendant will virtually always
refrain from the tortious activity.
91 See, for example, Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S Cal L Rev 1, 3-12 (1982) (discussing other, less prominent, goals that punitive
damages may promote, such as providing greater incentives for private law enforcement and
attorney fee shifting).
92 See C.Y. Cyrus Chu, Sheng-cheng Hu, and Ting-yuan Huang, Punishing Repeat Offend-
ers More Severely, 20 Intl Rev L & Econ 127, 127 (2000) (observing that punishing repeat of-
fenders more harshly "is a generally accepted practice of almost all penal codes or sentencing
guidelines").
93 For the history of the doctrine in the common law, see Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing
and Criminal Justice 163-65 (Butterworths 3d ed 2000) (discussing the cumulative principle of
sentencing where each subsequent criminal conviction yields heavier penalties); Leon Radzinowicz
and Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: The English Experience, 78 Mich L Rev
1305, 1322-26 (1980) (discussing the cumulative system of sentencing); Leon Radzinowicz and
Roger Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Peren-
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rejected the claim that the imposition of harsher sanctions on recidi-
vists unconstitutionally subjects the accused to double jeopardy-
escalating sanctions have become prevalent." For a wide range of of-
fenses and administrative violations, federal as well as state laws impose
increasingly higher sanctions for violations committed repeatedly.9
Legal theorists -especially those concerned with optimal deter-
rence-have struggled to provide justifications for escalating sanctions
despite their prevalence.' In fact, some theorists have provided com-
pelling arguments against the practice of imposing escalating penal-
ties.9 Most importantly, because offenders with prior violations are
nial Problem, 127 U Pa L Rev 1288 (1979) (tracing the Victorian attempts to deal with criminal
sentencing issues, including the issue of repeat offenders).
94 334 US 728 (1948).
95 Id at 732 ("The sentence as a fourth offender or habitual criminal is not to be viewed as
either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the
latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."). For a
careful examination of the constitutionality of the practice in light of later cases, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 Stan L Rev 1049,1072-73 (2004).
96 Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, for example, the punishment of federal
crimes, both imprisonment terms and criminal fines, are increased if a defendant has a prior
record. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 4Al.1, 5E1.2, Ch 5 Pt
A (2003). Specific statutes often also set higher penalties for repeat offenders. For example,
hiring, recruiting, and referral violations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act impose
a minimum fine of $250 for a first offense, $2,000 for a second offense, and $3,000 for subsequent
offenses; in addition, "due consideration shall be given to ... the history of previous violations"
in setting penalties for paperwork violations. See 8 USC § 1324a(e)(4)-(5) (2000). For a detailed
overview of laws applying escalating penalties, both federal and state, see Dana, 110 Yale L J at
735-36 & nn 3-4 (cited in note 62).
97 See, for example, Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offend-
ers, 23 Intl Rev L & Econ 253, 253 (2003) ("For the rather developed law and economics litera-
ture on optimal law enforcement escalating sanction schemes are still a puzzle."); Dana, 110 Yale
L J at 737 (cited in note 62) ("For economists and law-and-economics scholars, however, the
principle of escalating penalties based on offense history is puzzling."). For some attempts to
rationalize the application of escalating penalties from an economic perspective, see Chu, Hu,
and Huang, 20 Intl Rev L & Econ at 134-36 (cited in note 92) (arguing that penalties should be
lesser for first-time offenders and greater for repeat offenders because of the increased risk of
erroneously convicting first-time offenders); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, On Of-
fense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 Intl Rev L & Econ 305 (1998) (arguing that esca-
lating penalties may be optimal insofar as they deter both initial and repeat offenders); A.
Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, 46 J
Pub Econ 291,303 (1991) (arguing that escalating penalties may be efficient if the probability of
detection is lower for repeat offenders because of their increased experience in committing
crimes). But see Moshe Burnovski and Zvi Safra, Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment
Policies: Should Repeat Offenders Be More Severely Punished?, 14 Intl Rev L & Econ 341 (1994)
(arguing that if total punishment is held constant, then increasing the punishment for an initial
violation and decreasing the punishment for subsequent violations increases total deterrence).
None of these attempts, however, provides a sufficient explanation. See Emons, 23 Intl Rev L &
Econ at 254-55 (describing previous research and concluding that "[a]t the very best the litera-
ture ... has shown that under rather special circumstances escalating penalty schemes may be
optimal").
98 See Emons, 23 Intl Rev L & Econ at 254 (cited in note 97) (concluding that the "optimal
sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing [with] the number of offenses").
The University of Chicago Law Review
more likely than first-time offenders to be detected," scholars have
claimed that "the economic model of optimal deterrence actually sup-
ports declining penalties based on offense history for some categories
of offenses, rather than nonescalating or escalating penalties.' ''a At
least in contexts where criminal sanctions are used to deter inefficient
behavior rather than aimed at providing complete deterrence,'1 repeat
players-in light of their higher chances of being detected-ought to
be subjected to more lenient rather than harsher sanctions. In such
contexts, it has been argued, a regime of escalating penalties may re-
sult in overdeterrence.
Probability matching, however, may provide a rationale for the
practice of escalating penalties. Individuals who face a one-time choice
to commit a harm-causing activity tend, as the experiments demon-
strate, to behave as maximizers. Consequently, optimal deterrence
requires setting the expected penalty equal to the social harm result-
ing from the activity. Under such a level of deterrence, violations will
occur only when the expected benefit outweighs the social cost. In
contrast, individuals facing repeated opportunities to perform the ac-
tivity may act as probability matchers. As such, they may occasionally
choose to perform the activity even if the expected penalty is higher
than the expected benefit. Therefore, an even higher penalty is re-
quired to incentivize probability matchers to refrain from violating the
law when it is socially undesirable. In the absence of a scheme of esca-
lating penalties, individuals with repeated opportunities to violate the
99 See Dana, 110 Yale L J at 744-54 (cite in note 62) (explaining and empirically demon-
strating why individuals acting repeatedly face higher chances of being detected when violating
applicable legal rules).
100 Id at 737. The argument provided for this conclusion is based on the standard "optimal
deterrence theory," associated with Gary Becker's seminal article, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J Polit Econ 169 (1968). Under the conventional deterrence model, two
variables fix the expected penalty: the probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanction
imposed on the offender once the violation is detected. The increase of either of these factors
results in a higher expected penalty. Because in the optimal-deterrence model the goal is not to
achieve complete deterrence but rather only deterrence of socially inefficient violations, "an
optimal expected penalty should equal the harm to society of the violation, so that the prospec-
tive offender will proceed with the violation only if the gain from doing so (which is also a socie-
tal welfare gain) exceeds the social harm that will result from the violation." Dana, 110 Yale L J
at 740 (cited in note 62). As such, if the probability for detection increases, to maintain the opti-
mal expected penalty, the size of the sanction must be reduced. Otherwise, overdeterrence is
expected.
101 While generally assuming less than maximal deterrence, in some contexts, such as vio-
lent crimes, optimal deterrence theory supports total deterrence considering the extremely high
social costs generated by such offenses. In other contexts, however, such as "environmental,
safety and labor regulations," optimal deterrence is probably less than maximal deterrence. In
the latter case, as Dana explains, a legal regime with decreasing penalties is apparently more
efficient. Dana, 110 Yale L J at 741-42 (cited in note 62).
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law would choose to commit the illegal behavior in accordance with
the predictions of probability matching9
Escalating penalties serve, therefore, the purpose of deterring both
one-time offenders and probability matchers at the lowest possible cost.
The legal system applies a price discriminating mechanism under which
severe (and expensive) sanctions are reserved only for individuals that
cannot be deterred by moderate penalties. Setting a low initial penalty
serves to deter individuals facing the choice occasionally; higher sanc-
tions are imposed only to deter individuals who face the choice repeat-
edly and are likely to apply a strategy of probability matching.'
3
Applying a flexible sanctions system, like adjusting investment in
law enforcement, tackles inefficiencies resulting from individuals' ten-
dency to apply probability matching. The next Part, discussing differ-
ent liability regimes, introduces a third method to overcome the defi-
ciencies resulting from probability matching. Individuals, as the experi-
ments demonstrate, behave as probability matchers only when faced
repeatedly with a choice involving probabilistic outcomes. Although
the probabilistic nature of legal liability is sometimes inevitable, in
some areas it is possible to make the imposition of liability a certainty.
In the latter case, probability matching would not occur. The next Part
shows how a shift from a harm- to a risk-based liability system may
often eliminate the probabilistic nature of legal rules. It also provides
several examples of contexts in which such a shift has occurred.
102 Another possible rationale for escalating penalties might be grounded in the differential
significance of social extralegal sanctions for repeat offenders and first-time offenders. Under
this explanation, the deterrent effect of extralegal sanctions for first-time offenders is particu-
larly high. This is because "once someone has been identified as (say) a convicted embezzler, he
or she loses most of the 'legitimate' opportunities and associations available to people without a
record." Id at 773. In contrast, an individual with prior history has little "social capital" to lose.
Because social sanctions decline based on offense history, a regime of escalating legal sanctions
might be necessary. Id at 773-74 (discussing the possibility of such a rationale and suggesting it
can explain some, but not all, contexts in which escalating sanctions are used).
103 Even with respect to offenses where total deterrence is efficient (such as violent crimes)
probability matching may justify a regime of escalating penalties. As initially claimed by Ben-
tham, and later elaborated by law and economics scholars, harsh sanctions are not costless and
ought to be avoided if unnecessary. First, severe penalties eliminate marginal deterrence-the
incentive to substitute less for more serious crimes. Second, severe sanctions increase enforce-
ment costs, such as costs resulting from long incarceration periods, or costs associated with col-
lecting large fines. Severe sanctions, therefore, must be avoided if more moderate penalties can
achieve a similar level of deterrence. Regimes of escalating penalties provide this result. A harsh
sanction is imposed only on those who, due to their tendency to match probabilities, are not
likely to be deterred by a less stringent penalty. For Jeremy Bentham's "principle of frugality,"
see Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 169 (Athlone
1970) (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds). For a more comprehensive economic analysis of the
advantages of moderate sanctions, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 221-23
(Aspen 6th ed 2003).
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IV. LIABILITY FOR THE IMPOSITION OF RISK
Legal systems looking to deter socially-undesirable risky activi-
ties may choose among three different liability regimes'" First, a legal
system could impose a risk-based liability system, namely a system that
imposes sanctions on those who inflict risk regardless of whether the
imposition of risk resulted in actual harm. Under this system, in order
to provide efficient incentives, the legal system ought to impose a
sanction that would equal the expected harm of the activity. Second, a
legal system could adopt a harm-based liability system, namely a sys-
tem in which only those who inflict actual harm are subject to sanc-
tions. In this case, to provide efficient incentives the legal system must
impose sanctions that are equal to the harm resulting from the behav-
ior of the wrongdoer. Last, a legal system could adopt a mixed (risk-
harm) liability system under which it imposes diverse sanctions. Under
such a system, those who inflicted risk that resulted in harm would be
subject to different (typically harsher) sanctions than those who in-
flicted risk that did not result in harm.
For illustration, consider again a risky activity that generates a
$100 gain in 40 percent of cases, and a $100 loss in 60 percent of cases.
Making the defendant internalize the costs of her behavior can be
achieved under any of these three regimes. First, the law may apply a
risk-based system: under such a regime the defendant is required to
pay $60 irrespective of the actual results of her behavior. Alterna-
tively, the law may use a harm-based system: the defendant must pay
full compensation ($100), but only when her activity results in actual
harm. Finally, the law may apply a mixed system: under such a liability
regime the defendant is required to pay whenever she acts, but com-
pensation will vary based on the materialization of the harm. For ex-
ample, when the activity does not result in harm the defendant pays
$30; when harm materializes she pays $80. Under any of these three
possibilities the defendant bears the costs ($60) of her behavior. 5
Whereas all systems apparently produce the same incentives,
probability matching suggests that a harm-based system may result in
underdeterrence. Assuming detection is possible whenever the defen-
dant acts, the imposition of liability under a risk-based system is cer-
tain, as individuals are required to pay for every risk-imposing action.
In contrast, under a harm-based system the actual payment is only
104 For a comprehensive discussion, see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis
of Law at ch 25 (cited in note 82) (differentiating between "act-based" and "harm-based" forms
of liability); Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty ch 4 (Oxford 2001)
(discussing "risk-based liability" versus "damage-based liability").
105 Under the "mixed regime," the defendant pays $30 in 40 percent of cases, and $80 in 60
percent of cases. The expected cost of the activity (40% x $30 + 60% x $80) is thus exactly $60.
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probabilistic. While harm is sometimes inflicted and triggers payment,
on other occasions the behavior entails no costs. If the defendant re-
peatedly faces the choice to perform the activity, under a harm-based
regime, she might apply the strategy of probability matching.
As a matter of practice, different liability regimes are applied in
various areas of law. Modern criminal law systems, for example, adopt
either the mixed or the risk-based system. Unsuccessful attempts (that
is, imposition of risk that did not materialize in harm) are now punish-
able in most jurisdictions."" In some systems the sanctions imposed for
attempts are more lenient than those imposed for the complete of-
fense, while in other systems the same sanction is imposed in both
cases.' O' Under either system, the imposition of criminal liability does
not require actual harm.
In contrast, the traditionally prevalent legal position in tort law is
that liability can only be imposed when the plaintiff has sustained
damage that was wrongfully inflicted by the defendant. A drunk driver,
for example, driving recklessly but hurting no one, cannot be sued in
tort. The mere imposition of risk is not compensable. Tort liability is
manifestly a harm-based regime."
Individuals involved in tort-related risky activities on a repeated
basis, especially if they are not subjected to criminal sanctions, are
therefore particularly prone to apply the strategy of probability
matching. The next two examples, however, show that in some tort-
related contexts the traditional harm-based approach has been replaced
by rules endorsing risk-based liability.
106 For a discussion of the treatment of attempts in criminal law, see Omri Ben-Shahar and
Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145
U Pa L Rev 299, 323-30 (1996) (describing the doctrinal principles governing the characteriza-
tion of attempts in criminal law).
107 Although lenient criminal sanctions for incomplete crimes are not uncommon, there is
an ongoing transition towards reducing the gap in the sanctions imposed for attempts and com-
pleted crimes. The Model Penal Code, for example, recommends equal punishment for both
complete and incomplete crimes. See Model Penal Code Art 5 at 295 (ALl 1985) (stating that
one of the major results of the Model Penal Code provisions is "to establish these inchoate
crimes as offenses of comparable magnitude to the completed crimes that are their object"). See
also Yoram Shachar, The Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality, 6 Crim Just Ethics 12, 13 (1987)
("Punishment for attempt has slowly ... gain[ed] parity with maximum punishment in many of
the common law jurisdictions, most notably in England itself and in many of the American
states.") (internal citations omitted).
108 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regu-
lation, 87 Minn L Rev 1293,1437 (2003) (explaining that current tort law doctrine "typically does
require the occurrence of death, bodily injury, property damage, or at least emotional harm, for a
tort suit to go forward. Risk imposition per se is, typically, not enough"). See also Eric A. Posner
and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U Chi L Rev 537, 557-59 (2005) (examining the
differences between tort and regulatory law and the valuation of life, and suggesting that the tort
regime's harm-based approach is insufficient to compensate harms in cases of wrongful death
whereas a risk-based regime would adequately do so).
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In light of the traditional harm-based paradigm of tort law, doc-
tors who perform negligently have generally been liable only if caus-
ing actual damage. In recent years, however, in the context of medical
malpractice, courts have shown greater willingness to substitute the
harm-based approach with liability that is based on risk.79 Using doc-
trines such as "loss of chance" or "increased risk of harm," courts,
rather than inquiring whether doctors' negligence causally resulted in
harm, began awarding the plaintiff compensation based on the risk
created by the doctors' negligence. Because doctors' negligence may
often potentially be the reason that the patient has not recovered, the
application of these doctrines transformed tort liability in these con-
texts from a harm-based to a risk-based regime.""
This shift from the traditional harm-based approach to a risk-based
approach has eliminated, to a large extent, the probabilistic nature of
doctors' liability. Under these new doctrines, physicians can expect to
be sued whenever they fail to meet the standards of the profession.
Admittedly, the imposition of liability might still be probabilistic because
patients may not always be able to detect doctors' negligence. But where
detection is feasible, liability would be imposed with certainty."'
Likewise, in the context of tortious exposure to toxic substances,
an increasing number of courts have replaced the conventional harm-
based approach with liability that is essentially based on the creation
of risk."' Using various doctrines, these courts have allowed plaintiffsto recover damages without showing actual injury."3 Tortfeasors, under
109 For an overview, see Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 ALR 4th 10
(1987) (analyzing the state and federal cases that consider risk-based liability in medical mal-
practice claims).
110 See Adler, 87 Minn L Rev at 1437-38 (cited in note 108) ("Risk imposition per se is,
typically, not enough. But there are a few important doctrinal exceptions .... [I]n so-called 'loss-
of-chance' cases, some courts have imposed liability for the mere creation of a risk.").
1 One can think of several reasons why a patient will not sue even when the detection of
doctors' negligence is likely. For example, the patient may not be aware of the possibility of
suing, or she might lack the financial resources necessary for filing and handling the claim. Insur-
ance, however, often helps to overcome these hurdles, as the insurance company becomes the
plaintiff in interest.
112 See Adler, 87 Minn L Rev at 1438-39 (cited in note 108) (noting that "in the toxic tort
context ... some courts do award damages to plaintiffs who have been exposed to a toxic sub-
stance and whose risk of death or disease has been increased by that exposure, but have not died
and are currently asymptomatic for the diseases possibly resulting from the exposure").
113 See Tamsen Douglass Love, Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Sub-
stances: The Case for Legislative Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 Vand L Rev
789, 804 (1996) (explaining that courts have developed three doctrines to deal with toxic tort
issues-"medical monitoring," "fear for future disease," and "outright recovery for increased risk
of disease"-and that "[aill three ... essentially allow the plaintiff to recover before it is known
whether she will actually suffer a medical problem as a result of the defendant's conduct. As
such, all three are essentially causes of action for increased risk, though only one is explicitly
framed in these terms").
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these doctrines, are compelled to pay all individuals who may have
been harmed (or who may be harmed in the future) by the exposure
to their toxic substances. Rather than paying only those who actually
suffer provable injury, a defendant's liability is extended to every indi-
vidual who is placed at risk by the toxic materials."'
Medical malpractice and exposure to toxic substances are two
contexts in which courts have shown willingness to impose liability for
the mere infliction of risk. From a theoretical perspective, liability for
risk imposition can be extended to other categories. Scholars have
indeed suggested applying a similar approach in other contexts such
as latent disease, labor injuries, and others. ' To the extent these sug-
gestions will be implemented, the probabilistic nature of tort liability
will be substantially diminished.
To be sure, identifying the most advantageous type of liability sys-
tem in each category requires balancing several concerns. Different
factors lend support to each type of regime. A harm-based system, for
example, triggers less litigation, as it allows claims only when the
plaintiff suffers actual damage." ' A harm-based system is also less ex-
posed to judicial errors, at least with respect to cost-benefit evaluation
of the activity. Under a risk-based system, because claims may be filed
even when the risky activity did not cause any damage, courts must
form their evaluation without actual evidence concerning the resulting
114 See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-
Exposure Cases, 71 NYU L Rev 210, 218-19 (1996):
These claims are styled "risk-based" because they are predicated simply on exposure to a
tortiously imposed risk. They seek damages without regard to formal accrual or any physi-
cal effect (manifested or not) of the ultimate major harm and loss, which is causally associ-
ated with the tortious act in question; indeed, they seek damages without regard to formal
accrual-or any physical effect-of causally related minor or precursor condition.
115 For several such proposals, see, for example, Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Dam-
ages, 111 Harv L Rev 1505 (1998) (considering the appropriate solution to the problem of latent
harms left uncompensated by the legal system); Keith W. Lapeze, Recovery for Increased Risk of
Disease in Louisiana, 58 La L Rev 249 (1997) (analyzing potential solutions to increased risk
cases under Louisiana law); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for In-
creasing Risks, 37 UCLA L Rev 439 (1990) (arguing that the link between corrective justice and
causation is not essential to the law); Note, An Analysis of the Enhanced Risk Cause of Action
(Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste), 33 Viii L Rev 437 (1988) (examin-
ing the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court to enhanced risk claims, which takes a mod-
erate position between traditional tort principles and enhanced risk liability); Glen 0. Robinson,
Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J Legal Stud 779 (1985) (examin-
ing risk-based liability by considering both the objectives of tort law and the potential problems
that a risk-based system could create).
116 See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 582 (cited in note 82) (sug-
gesting that one disadvantage of the risk-based approach is that "the volume of cases that would
have to be considered would be plausibly at least a hundred times larger than the volume" under
a harm-based regime).
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harm."' Under a harm-based regime, where the plaintiff can sue only
when harm has been inflicted, evidence concerning the harms gener-
ated by the activity is available. On the other hand, risk-based systems
seem less arbitrary. Liability under these schemes does not depend on
luck; all defendants with equal moral culpability are subjected to simi-
lar sanctions irrespective of the (random) results of their behavior. "'
Effective deterrence considerations, such as taking the solvency of the
perpetrator into account, may also support a risk-based approach."'
Given the plurality of factors that bear on this question, the deci-
sion regarding which liability regime should be applied in a certain
context might be complicated. Probability matching, however, suggests
that risk-based systems are especially attractive in cases of repeated
misconduct. In some cases, other relevant factors may outweigh this
consideration. Yet if the activity is not likely to trigger criminal sanctions,
if the concern for courts' misevaluation is unlikely, and if the volume of
litigation is riot prohibitive, applying a risk-based regime can overcome
inefficiencies resulting from the probability matching phenomenon.
CONCLUSION
Rational choice approaches predict that individuals will consis-
tently behave in a way that maximizes their utility. Rational choice
theory attributes behavioral changes either to objective alterations in
the environments in which these individuals interact, or to alterations
in individuals' preferences, beliefs, or attitudes toward risks.'20 Reality,
117 Id (explaining that under a risk-based regime, a legal system looking to decide which
activities are dangerous "would encounter serious informational problems" and "making such
determinations [would be] more difficult than evaluating behavior that has resulted in harm").
118 For a discussion concerning the moral advantages of legal risk-based regimes, see Chris-
topher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L Rev 143
(1990). For a critical response, see Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-
Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L Rev 113 (1990). For further corrective justice arguments, see
Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 Valp U L Rev 485 (1989). For a useful collection of
essays on the more general problem of "moral luck," see Daniel Statman, ed, Moral Luck
(SUNY 1993).
119 See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 577 (cited in note 82):
[Risk]-based sanctions do not require that sanctions be as high as harm-based sanctions, if
the harm due to an act is probabilistic.... A party needs to have much higher assets to be
deterred by the threat of sanctions for doing harm than by the threat of sanctions for com-
mitting an act, if the act causes harm only with a low probability.
For illustration, consider the example of an activity generating a $100 gain in 40 percent of cases
and a $100 loss in 60 percent of cases. Under a risk-based system, the expected sanction is only
$60; this in contrast to $100 under the harm-based possibility. If the actor possesses less than $100
but more than $60, effective deterrence can be achieved only under a risk-based system.
120 See, for example, Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in Jon
Elster, ed, Rational Choice 108-19 (NYU 1986) (discussing the rational-choice assumption of
behavior consistency and the reasons for behavioral alterations).
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however, suggests otherwise. People faced with a series of decisions
involving repeated choices with probabilistic costs or benefits often
change their behavior despite no apparent alterations in their prefer-
ences or environments.
This gap between rational choice theories and reality, however,
does not indicate that the hope of anticipating the behavior of indi-
viduals must be abandoned. In the special context of repeated choices,
probability matching provides the theoretical background that is re-
quired to bring theorists' models closer to the actual world. Because
legal contexts are often typified by probabilistic costs and benefits,
probability matching is of special interest for legal scholars.
This Article has demonstrated that there are at least three ways
in which the legal system can address probability matching. First, to
avoid inefficiencies resulting from probability matching, ex ante in-
vestment in law enforcement should be adjusted to take probability
matching into account. Second, the legal system can implement a re-
gime of ex post escalating sanctions and thereby differentiate between
agents who repeatedly engage in a certain behavior and agents who
engage in it only occasionally. These two methods manipulate incen-
tives in order to adjust for probability matching. Third, the legal sys-
tem may also avoid the conditions under which probability matching
can occur. By using a risk-based rather than a harm-based liability
scheme, the legal system minimizes the probabilistic nature of legal
sanctions and induces individuals to behave as maximizers.
The discussion concerning the regulation of socially undesirable
behavior finds a mirror image in another argument concerning so-
cially desirable behavior. Probability matching indicates that individu-
als who face repeated choices regarding socially desirable activities may
take risks that are too small. Consider, for example, an individual who
can invest $100 in an activity that is expected to yield, with equal
probability, either $0 or $300. Although the expected benefit from the
activity is higher than its costs, a risk-neutral individual who faces the
choice repeatedly is expected to invest too little in such projects. Al-
though the individual would invest most of the time, she would occa-
sionally forgo the opportunity, due to her inclination to "match" the
probabilities. As with socially undesirable behavior, the legal system
may apply different solutions. First, it may be desirable to increase the
expected payoff of the project to induce the individual to invest. Pro-
viding subsidies to those who repeatedly engage in such projects may,
under these circumstances, be efficient. Second, the probabilistic nature
of the payoff may be minimized. This may be achieved by promising
the individual a consistent reward for her efforts.
This last observation suggests that probability matching ought to
have a larger impact on the legal system than investigated in this Arti-
20051
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cle. Further research is thus necessary to complement these findings.
The legal regulation of repeated conduct (either wrongful or desir-
able) ought to reflect the realities of behavior as revealed by experi-
mental literature. Our analysis has demonstrated that the legal system
already applies various mechanisms to overcome the inefficiencies re-
sulting from probability matching.
